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Abstract: The implementation of a deposit insurance scheme entails a trade-off. On the one hand,
as shown in theoretical and empirical studies, a deposit insurance scheme reduces the likelihood of
a bank run. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme induces moral hazard among bankers
that may lead to bank failures. This study rigorously tests the effect of different deposit coverage
limits and the implementation of a differential premium treatment on bankers’ behaviours in the
deposit and credit market using a laboratory experiment designed to involve real bankers as partici-
pants. This study found that the coverage of limit treatments does not have any effect on the
deposit rate offer. Nevertheless, this study found that a high deposit coverage limit induces smaller
banks to have a higher share of risky projects. The evidence of moral hazard is particularly found
among small banks.
Keywords: banking; credit market; deposit insurance; deposit market; laboratory experi-
ment; moral hazard




A deposit insurance scheme is an es-
sential component of a financial system
safety net in an economy. Thus, many gov-
ernments have implemented either an im-
plicit or explicit deposit insurance scheme
(Demirgüç-kunt et al. 2008; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 2014; García 1999). The imple-
mentation of a deposit insurance scheme,
however, entails a trade-off. On the one
hand, a deposit insurance scheme reduces
risk premium, the likelihood of a bank run
or a bank crisis. The effects of a deposit
insurance scheme have been shown theo-
retically and empirically by McCoy (2006),
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009), Janoss
Kiss et al. (2011), Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Anginer et al. (2014), Barth et al.
(2004) and Bartholdy et al. (2003).
On the other hand, a deposit insur-
ance scheme may induce moral hazard
among bankers (McCoy 2006; Chernykh
and Cole 2011; Grossman 1992; Ioannidou
and Penas 2010; Keeley 1990). The insur-
ance incentivises bankers to increase lever-
age by offering a higher deposit rate to de-
positors. As a result, the bank needs to in-
crease the loan interest rate. Borrowers that
take a higher interest rate are the ones with
riskier projects. This process increases the
risk of the bank’s asset portfolio. If such a
process occurred system-wide, a deposit
insurance scheme might lead to a bank fail-
ure (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002)
As far as the researchers are aware,
whether or not a deposit insurance scheme
and the size of its coverage induces moral
hazard among bankers have not been tested
rigorously. Using an experimental setting,
the researchers contribute to the literature
by testing the effects of deposit insurance
schemes on bankers’ behaviours particu-
larly in offering a deposit rate and choos-
ing projects. This study also tests whether
bankers’ choices differ when they have to
pay a fixed insurance premium in compari-
son to when they have to pay a risk-based
premium.
This study achieved this by designing
and conducting a laboratory experiment in
which the decision-making environment
was motivated by the setting of the deposit
insurance scheme in Indonesia. The experi-
ment consists of two markets: the deposit
market and the credit market. Within these
markets, three banks compete to attract
funds and to channel them as credits. One
of the banks has a large initial asset, while
the other two banks have smaller primary
assets and such a composition reflects the
fact that, in Indonesia, the number of small
banks significantly exceeds the number of
large banks.
This study found that increasing the
coverage limit does not affect bankers’ de-
posit rate offers. These findings explain that
bankers tend to compete to attract all funds
available in the market irrespective of the
coverage limit. The existence of a deposit
insurance scheme, however, significantly
reduces the likelihood of bankers offering
a deposit rate higher than the threshold rate.
This implies that a deposit insurance
scheme is essential in keeping the costs of
funds low. This study also found that big
banks are more likely to offer a deposit rate
above the threshold rate than the small
banks. By doing so, the big banks have a
higher probability of attracting funds from
the depositors and keeping the costs of
funds low. The researchers’ findings about
the credit market suggest that a deposit in-
surance scheme with a high coverage limit
induces moral hazard among small banks.
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This study contributes to several
strands of literature regarding deposit insur-
ance schemes. The first strand of the litera-
ture includes experimental studies that in-
vestigate the impact of a deposit insurance
scheme on depositors’ behaviours. The first
experimental study in this literature shows
that an implementation of a full-coverage
insurance scheme prevents bank panics
(Madiès 2006). A follow-up study investi-
gates the effect of alternative insurance cov-
erages and their interaction with the
observability of depositors’ choices. This
study found that an insurance scheme with
either full or partial coverage reduces bank
failure if depositors’ choices were observed.
Moreover, an insurance scheme with full
coverage reduces bank failure even if de-
positors’ choices are not observed (Janoss
Kiss et al. 2011). A more recent study found
that uncertainty about the size of a partial-
coverage insurance scheme increases the
likelihood of a bank run (Peia and
Vranceanu 2017).
The second strand of literature includes
studies that use observational data to inves-
tigate the effects of a deposit insurance
scheme on various outcomes in the bank-
ing sector. Using a sample of developing
and developed countries between 1980 and
1994, one study found that a deposit in-
surance scheme is negatively correlated
with bank stability (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache 2002). Another study that uses
cross-country panel data between 1980 and
2004 also finds an effect of a deposit insur-
ance scheme on bank insolvency and bank
runs (Ngalawa et al. 2016). A similar study
also shows that the implementation of a de-
posit insurance scheme increases the likeli-
hood of bank failure (Hooks and
Robinson 2002), loan-deposit rate spread
(Carapella and Giorgio 2004), and moral
hazard (Yilmaz and Muslumov 2008).
The main issue seen in these findings
is the identification of the effect of the de-
posit insurance scheme on the outcomes
of interests. First, changes in outcomes over
time cannot be attributed only to the in-
troduction of or changes to a deposit in-
surance system but also to changes in other
variables that were not observed in the es-
timation model. Second, these studies face
the issue of reverse causality or simultane-
ity bias. For example, an implementation
of a high coverage limit in the deposit in-
surance system may increase risk-taking
behaviours among banks. As a response to
these behaviours, the agency increases the
coverage limit to maintain the confidence
of the market. It is difficult, therefore, to
isolate the effect of the deposit insurance
scheme on behaviours. This study contrib-
utes to this literature by providing a rigor-
ous identification of the deposit insurance
effect using an experimental method.
The third strand of literature includes
studies that discuss components of a de-
posit insurance scheme that may reduce
moral hazard. A component that may in-
duce depositors’ oversight of a bank’s
behaviours is the coverage limit. The limit
imposes the amount of deposit that will be
insured by the system in cases of bank fail-
ure (García 1999). Another component that
may be integrated into a deposit insurance
scheme is the differential premium, which
differentiates insurance premiums based on
the risks of a bank’s asset portfolio. Thus,
a bank with a riskier asset portfolio pays a
higher premium. The implementation of a
differential premium may incentivise banks
to manage and to reduce the risk of their
asset portfolio. As of 2013, 35 countries
Sahadewo et al.
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1 This figure is based on exchange rate in end of July whereby US$1 is equivalent to IDR14,500
have implemented the differential premium
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). The effect of
a differential premium on banking
behaviours, however, is not known. This
study contributes to this literature by pro-
viding empirical evidence on the effect of a
differential premium on banking
behaviours.
Lastly, this study provides essential
policy insights for the design of the Indo-
nesian Deposit Insurance System. The In-
donesian banking system consists of 116
conventional banks and more than 1,600
rural banks. These banks are facing stiff
competition in acquiring deposit funds and
in channelling the funds to the credit mar-
ket. Moreover, many rural banks are not
well managed. As a result, almost all of the
83 banks liquidated by the Indonesian De-
posit Insurance Corporation since its es-
tablishment in 2004, were rural banks.
There is a concern that the current deposit
insurance coverage of IDR2 billion
(US$13,793) induces moral hazard among
rural banks. 1 Indeed, this study provides
an insight that high deposit insurance cov-
erage may induce risk-taking behaviours
among small banks.
Experimental Design
The primary objective of this study
is to investigate the effects of a deposit in-
surance scheme on moral hazard among
bankers using an experimental method.
The primary outcomes of interest in the
experiment are banks’ deposit rate offers
and choices of projects. Therefore, the re-
searchers desiged a decision-making experi-
ment with two distinct markets: the deposit
market (Stage 1) and the credit market
(Stage 2). As an overview, banks collect
funds in the deposit market and channel
the collected funds to finance projects in
the credit market. The completion of
projects and realizations of projects’ out-
comes indicates the end of a particular
round.
The Deposit Market
There are three players in the experi-
ment: bankers, depositors, and debtors.
Participants play the role of bankers, while
computers play the roles of depositors and
debtors. The decision to use computerised
depositors and debtors is entirely a design
choice. First, the main focus of the experi-
ment is to investigate bankers’ behaviours.
Second, the costs for having participants
playing the role of depositors and debtors
would be quite high. Third, participants, if
they were to play the role of depositors and
debtors, would have much idle time after
they made decisions. The downside of this
design choice is that depositors and debt-
ors are entirely rational because they
choose banks only based on interest rates.
The roles of banks in the experiment
are to negotiate a deposit rate with deposi-
tors in the deposit market and to negotiate
a credit rate with debtors in the credit mar-
ket. The setting in Indonesia motivates the
composition of banks in the market and
banks’ functions. Specifically, there are
three banks in the market: a bank with a
large asset (henceforth, a big bank) and two
banks with smaller but equal assets (hence-
forth, small banks). Each participant plays
a particular role for the entire experimen-
tal sessions. The big bank may channel
depositors’ funds to finance projects (inter-
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mediary financial function) or to purchase
risk-free assets that provide a fixed return
of 6 percent (non-financial intermediary
function). On the other hand, the small
banks can only channel depositors’ funds
to finance projects.
There are 10 depositors played by
computers in the deposit market. Each de-
positor has a different amount of funds and
reserve deposit rates. In Table 1, research-
ers summarise the depositors’ funds and
reserve deposit rate. The depositors’ re-
serve deposit rate is known to the deposi-
tors, but not the banks. This study design
the depositor composition to be as close
as possible to the actual composition in the
Indonesian deposit market.
Note that the reserve deposit rates are
a function of the amount of funds and the
size of the bank. Specifically, a depositor
with a larger fund has a higher reserve de-
posit rate. For each depositor, this study
assumed that the reserve deposit rate for
the big bank is smaller than that of the rate
for small banks with a fixed margin of 200
basis points (2%). This study based this
assumption on the average difference in
interest rates between small and big banks
which is about 200-250 basis points. The
depositors, however, view the two rates as
equivalent, e.g. depositor 5 is indifferent
between a 5.00 percent deposit rate offered
by the big bank and a 7.00 percent deposit
rate offered by the small banks. This equal-
ity depicts non-pecuniary benefits that ac-
tual depositors enjoy from big banks such
as the availability of online services, a more
extensive ATM network, interoperability,
and interconnectedness.
The depositor’s decision rule is to
choose a bank that offered a deposit rate
above her reserve deposit rate. If more than
one bank offered deposit rates above the
reserve rate, then the depositor chooses a
bank that offered the highest deposit rate
considering the 2 percent fixed margin. For
example, suppose that the big bank offered
Depositor 1 4.25 percent while one of the
small banks offered her 6.00 percent. De-
positor 1 will choose the big bank because
the offered deposit rate is equal to 6.25 per-
cent if offered by a small bank.
For the experiment, this study de-
signed a deposit insurance scheme featur-
ing a coverage limit, a deposit rate thresh-
old, and an insurance premium. These fea-
tures are similar to the those set by the In-
donesian Deposit Insurance Corporation




Depositor Funds Big Small
(points) Bank Banks
1 50 4.00 6.00
2 50 4.00 6.00
3 50 4.00 6.00
4 75 4.50 6.50
5 75 4.50 6.50
6 150 4.75 6.25
7 300 5.00 7.00
8 600 5.25 7.25
9 1,250 5.50 7.50
10 2,500 5.75 7.75
Total funds
in the deposit 5,100
market




scheme. It is important to note that the big
bank and the small banks are subject to
different deposit rate thresholds. During
the design phase in November 2017, the
actual threshold deposit rates set by the
IDIC were 5.75 percent for big banks and
8.75 percent for small banks. For the re-
searchers experiment, also in this study set
a threshold deposit rate for large banks to
be 6 percent, while for small banks it be-
comes 8 percent.
The bank is obligated to return each
depositor’s deposit plus interest at the end
of the round. The interest that banks must
pay to each depositor based on the deposit
rate agreed in the deposit market. For ex-
ample, suppose that a bank collected 75
points from Depositor 4 with a deposit rate
of 5 percent. The end of the round, the
bank must return the 75 points plus 3.75
interests to Depositor 4.
Finally, a bank must pay a deposit
insurance premium to the experimenter.
The premium is proportional to the funds
collected from the deposit market. In the
baseline treatment, banks must pay a fixed
3 percent premium. In the differential pre-
mium treatment, a bank premium deter-
mined by its asset portfolio. Banks hold-
ing a riskier asset portfolio must pay a
higher premium. The calculation of risk-
based premium will be discussed in the next















Expected Net Gain= 
Expected Gain – 
Expected Loss 
1 250 50 25 31,25 12,5 18,75 
2 250 50 25 31,25 12,5 18,75 
3 250 50 25 31,25 12,5 18,75 
4 250 50 25 31,25 12,5 18,75 
5 500 50 22 55 25 30 
6 500 50 22 55 25 30 
7 250 70 14 24,5 7,5 17 
8 250 70 14 24,5 7,5 17 
9 500 70 10 35 15 20 
10 500 70 10 35 15 20 
11 250 80 10 20 5 15 
12 250 80 10 20 5 15 
13 500 80 9 36 10 26 
14 500 80 9 36 10 26 
Total 5.000      
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subsection. Note that the premium in the
real economy is quite small at less than 1
percent. In this study, a higher premium
was set in the experiment so that the pres-
ence of the deposit insurance is salient.
During a particular round in the ex-
periment, the deposit market opens for
four transaction phases. Each phase lasts
for 180 seconds, and bankers can offer a
deposit rate to depositors within the allo-
cated time. Note that banks do not know
the reserve deposit rate of each depositor.
Thus, depositors can either reject or accept
a bank’s offer according to the decision
rule. In the subsequent phases, banks can
offer deposit rate to the remaining deposi-
tors.
The Credit Market
Banks channel funds collected in the
deposit market to finance projects in the
credit market. Banks can choose to finance
projects from 14 firms, each with different
capital requirements, project risk, and a
maximum credit rate they can bear. The
researchers summarised the firms in the
credit market in Table 2. In general, the
projects can be divided into three risk cat-
egories: a high-risk project, a medium-risk
project, and a low-risk project. A high-risk
project has only a 50 percent chance of
success, while medium and low-risk
projects have 70 and 80 percent chance of
success, respectively.
Firms also have different preferences
regarding the maximum credit rate, which
is increasing with risk. Given the same capi-
tal requirement, firms with a high-risk
project are willing to pay a higher credit
rate than firms with medium or low-risk
projects. For example, Firm 1 is willing to
accept a credit rate of up to 25 percent while
Firm 7 is willing to accept a credit rate of
up to 14 percent.
Banks that finance a successful project
will receive the funds that were invested
plus interest. For example, suppose that a
bank finances Firm 1 with a credit rate of
25 percent and the firm’s project is success-
ful. The bank will receive the 250 capital
plus interest of 62.5. On the other hand,
suppose Firm 1’s project fails. The bank
will receive 90 percent, which is the recov-
ery rate, of total capital invested. In this
example, the recovery rate is 225.
Overall, the expected gain of invest-
ing in each of the projects exceeds the ex-
pected loss. Thus, the expected net gain of
each project is positive. Note, however,
that there are variations in the expected net
gains across projects that depend on the risk
and the capital requirement. First, the ex-
pected net gains for high-risk projects are
higher than the gains for medium or low-
risk projects given the same capital require-
ment. This variation incentivises banks to
finance high-risk projects. Second, the ex-
pected net gains increase with the capital
requirement given the same risk profile.
This variation incentivises banks to finance
projects with a higher capital requirement.
This study should note that banks,
especially the big bank, have an option not
to channel the funds to finance a project.
As mentioned in an earlier paragraph, the
big bank’s remaining funds that are not
channelled to finance a project will be in-
vested automatically in a risk-free instru-
ment that provides a fixed 6 percent return.
This setting is designed based on the bank-
ing system in Indonesia. It is also impor-
tant to highlight that the total funds avail-
able in the market are 5,100 points, which
is slightly larger than the total fund needed
Sahadewo et al.
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Table 3. Project Index Based on Its risk
Success Weighted Project
Nominal Probability (%) Capital Index
Requirement
250 50 250 1
500 50 500 1
250 70 350 1.4
500 70 700 1.4
250 80 400 1.6
500 80 800 1.6
to fund all projects. The relatively small
excess supply of funds ensures the banks
have some latitude in channelling the funds
to the projects.
Similar to the deposit market, the
credit market opens for four transaction
phases. Each phase lasts for 180 seconds,
and banks may offer a credit rate to firms
within the allocated time. Banks do not
know the maximum credit rate threshold
of each depositor. The creditors, therefore,
may either reject or accept a bank’s offer
according to the decision rule. In the sub-
sequent phases, banks may offer credit rate
to the remaining firms whose projects are
not financed.
 Differential Premium
In the baseline treatment, banks pay
a fixed 3 percent premium to the experi-
menter. In the differential premium treat-
ment, however, a bank pays a differential
premium that depends on the risk profile
of its asset portfolio. A bank with a riskier
portfolio pays a higher premium.
This study used the following proce-
dure to determine company premiums:
first, weigh project capital requirements
with a relative probability of success; sec-
ond, calculate the project index which is
the ratio between weighted capital require-
ments and capital requirements.
The formula in this study implies that
the probability of success, but not the capi-
tal requirement, determines a project’s in-
dex. As shown in Table 3, projects with
the same success probability have the same
index irrespective of their capital require-
ment, and then the project index was used
to calculate a bank’s risk index. The for-
mula to calculate a bank’s risk index is
..................................................(1)
For instance, a bank finances a 250-
point project with a success probability of
50 percent and a 500-point project with a
success probability of 70 percent. The risk
index for the bank is 1.27. A bank’s risk
index determines the premium that a bank
has to pay. Specifically, a bank must pay a
premium of 5 percent if the risk index is
strictly lower than 1.4, of 3 percent if the
risk index is higher than or equal to 1.4 and
is lower than or equal to 1.6, of 1 percent if
the risk index is strictly higher than 1.6.
Treatment Design
This study used a combination of
within-subject and between-subject designs
in this experiment and summarised the
treatment design in Table 4. For the within-
subject treatment, researchers fix the de-
posit insurance scheme and vary the cov-
erage limit. To avoid a sequence effect, the
researchers varied the sequence of the cov-
erage limit in different sessions. For ex-
ample, in the first session, the sequence
           =
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starts from the highest coverage limit and
ends with the no deposit insurance treat-
ment. In the second session, the sequence
starts from the no deposit insurance treat-
ment and ends with the highest coverage
limit.
This study used the combination of
within-subjects and between-subjects de-
signs in this experiment; the treatment de-
sign is summarised in Table 4. For the
within-subject treatment, researchers fix
the deposit insurance scheme and vary the
coverage limit. To avoid a sequence effect,
researchers vary the sequence of the cov-
erage limit in different sessions. For ex-
ample, in the first session, the sequence
starts from the highest coverage limit and
ends with the no deposit insurance treat-
ment. In the second session, the sequence
starts from the no deposit insurance treat-
ment and ends with the highest coverage
limit
This study used the between-subjects
design to test the effect of a risk-based in-
surance premium on banks’ behaviours. In
the baseline session, a bank pays an insur-
ance premium which is 3 percent of the
total deposit it collected from the deposit
market. In the treatment session, a bank
pays an insurance premium that increases
with the risk profile of its asset portfolio.
Payoffs
One experimental session consisted of
four rounds in which the deposit insurance
scheme is fixed while the coverage limit
varies. The researchers randomly chose 1
out of 4 rounds for a payment round; and
used such a design to induce participants
to make decisions optimally in each round.
The design could also minimise an income
or portfolio effect as well as hedging
behaviour. This study also randomised the
chosen payment round across experimen-
tal sessions.
The payoffs for the big bank are the
sum of primary assets, returns from suc-
cessful projects, returns from unsuccessful
projects, and unchanneled funds plus their
interest, which are then the amount of de-
posit returned to depositors, and the pre-
mium payment deducted. The payoffs for
the small banks are similar although they
do not obtain interest from the unchan-
neled funds. The total payoffs from the
chosen payment round were converted to
Indonesian rupiah with a conversation rate
of IDR1,000 for every 1 point of payoff.
A bank fails if the payoff is negative
at the end of the round. This implies that
the bank’s revenue from interest cannot





Coverage Limit  
(within Subjects) 
Baseline:  
coverage limit + deposit rate threshold + 











coverage limit + deposit rate threshold + 











Table 4. Treatment Design
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interest payment and insurance premium.
Note that the experimenter insures deposi-
tors’ funds when a bank fails in the case of
non-negative insurance treatment (high,
medium, and low coverage limit treatment).
Thus, the failed bank receives zero points.
On the other hand, in the case of no insur-
ance treatment, the bank’s negative payoff
is erased at the payment counter. This
study erases the negative payoff in a sur-
prising manner and, more importantly, in
private.2
Participants
The researchers collaborated with the
Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation
to recruit managerial-level bankers into the
subject pool. These bankers work in con-
ventional banks, both state-owned and pri-
vate banks, as well as rural banks in
Yogyakarta, and did so by sending an invi-
tation letter and a leaflet containing general
information about incentivised decision-
making games in a computer laboratory.
This study did not mention or explain the
study’s investment game in the invitation
or in the leaflet.
The decision to invite bankers as par-
ticipants is mainly a design choice, first, to
investigate whether a deposit insurance
scheme affect bankers’ behaviours or not,
it is important to involve individuals expe-
2 We discuss materials, procedures, and participants in an online appendix that can be accessed through
the following link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/uz9d59x8rfn98eq/onlineappendix.docx?dl=0.
Source: authors’ calculations from primary data
Note: estimated coefficients excluded from the table are dummies for transaction phases, and a dummy for sequence. The
notations *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
Table 5. The Effects of Coverage Limit and Differential Premium Treatments on Ad-
justed Deposit Rate
Dependent Variable: 







    
1  If Differential Premium Treatment 0.57*** 0.26 0.42** 
 (0.20) (0.34) (0.18) 
    
2,000 Coverage Limits -0.15 -0.35 -0.23* 
 (0.14) (0.23) (0.13) 
    
500 Coverage Limits -0.14 -0.057 -0.098 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) 
    
No Coverage Limit -0.12 -0.041 -0.096 
 (0.17) (0.32) (0.17) 
    
1  If Big Bank   0.52*** 
   (0.19) 
 
Observations 
923 605 1,528 
 
Pseudo R-sq 0.38 0.22 0.30 
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rienced in the banking sector. Indeed, stu-
dent participants usually recommended in
experimental economics. However, stu-
dents are not experienced in making deci-
sions in the banking sector.
This study obtains a subject pool of
120 bankers and randomises them into four
experimental sessions. Thus, each experi-
mental session consists of 30 bankers. The
participants were then randomly assigned
to a group of three. Within each group, a
participant was randomly assigned the role
of the big bank, and the other two were
the small banks. Several invitees did not
show up in several experimental sessions.
Therefore, the number of participants was
below 30 in these sessions. For example,
the number of participants in Session 2 and
3 was 27, while the number of participants
in Session 4 was 24.
Note that the staff from a particular
bank cannot attend the same experimental
sessions. This study emphasise to the bank-
ers that their identities are made anonymous
during the entire experiment, and further-
more, emphasise that the results will be
reported in aggregate but not individually,
and will not share individual banker’s re-
sults to their employers.
Table 5 presents a statistical summary
of the participants’ characteristics. The
share of female bankers was quite high in
session 1 and session 3. Previous studies
show that female bankers are more risk-
averse than male bankers (Byrnes et al.
1999; Eckel and Grossman 2008a; Eckel
and Grossman 2008b). Indeed, using the
post-experiment survey data, the research-
ers found that female bankers have a lower
risk preference index than male bankers
(diff. -0.306, p-value 0.0000). The implies
that gender composition needs to be con-
trolled for throughout the session. The
average age of bankers in the sample is 40.8




This study first summarises basic sta-
tistics on small and big banks’ decisions in
the deposit market.3 On average, the small
banks offered a deposit rate of 7.54 while
the big banks offered a deposit rate of 6.02
(difference 1.52, p-value 0.000). These sta-
tistics imply that the costs of funds for the
small banks were more significant than the
costs of funds for the big banks. Thus, the
small banks might have had to invest in
firms that were willing to accept higher
credit rate.
Bear in mind that depositors have dif-
ferent reserve deposit rates for big and small
banks. To accommodate variations in re-
serve deposit rates, the researchers calcu-
lated the difference between the offer of
bank deposit interest rates and depositors’
deposit interest rates. This study refers to
the adjusted deposit rate offer. By contrast,
the big banks offered higher adjusted de-
posit rates to depositors. On average, the
big banks offered a margin of 1.28 above
depositors’ reserve deposit rates, while the
small banks offered a margin of 0.88. This
implies that the big banks were able to ac-
quire more substantial amounts of funds
from the deposit market. Indeed, on aver-
age, the big banks acquired 2,703 points
3 The experimental data is available for replication upon request.
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from the deposit market, while the small
banks acquired 1,961.
The researchers analyzed the effects
of different deposit insurance schemes on
banks’ deposit offers. Specifically, the re-
searchers regressed the adjusted rate offer
on dummies for the coverage limit treat-
ments and a dummy for the differential
premium treatment are rejected, including
dummies for the transaction phases to con-
trol for the phase effect and a dummy that
indicates the type of the bank. Let I indi-
cate participant, p indicates the premium
treatment, s indicates the coverage limit
treatment, and t indicates the phase. The
regression model is:
where premium is a dummy with a value
of 1 to indicate differential treatment, cov-
erage is a vector of dummies for the cover-
age limit, big is a dummy with a value of 1
to indicate the big bank, X is a vector of
dummies for the transaction phases and a
dummy for sequence, a indicates partici-
pant-specific unobserved characteristics,
and  indicates idiosyncratic errors.
Note that the adjusted deposit rate
offer is bounded below at 0. This study used
the Tobit regression model to accommo-
date the corner solution. Note that the
implementation of the differential premium
treatment in a random manner should be
uncorrelated with individual characteristics
a. Thus, this study did not include partici-
pant-level fixed effects in the regression
model. Lastly, this study cluster the stan-
dard errors at the individual level to accom-
modate the within-subject design that

























    
1 If differential rate treatment -0.30 0.84 0.087 
 (0.79) (1.45) (0.80) 
    
2,000 Coverage limits 1.81*** 1.05 1.43** 
 (0.62) (1.13) (0.63) 
    
500 Coverage limits 0.29 0.67 0.27 
 (0.77) (0.78) (0.50) 
    
No coverage limit -0.093 0.42 -0.11 
 (0.73) (0.81) (0.54) 
    
1 If big bank   -2.95*** 
   (1.01) 
    
Observations 861 656 1517 
Pseudo R-sq 0.12 0.11 0.11 
 
Table 6. The Effects of Coverage Limit and Differential Rate Treatments on Credit
Rate Offer
Source: authors’ calculations from primary data
Note: estimated coefficients excluded from the table are dummies for transaction phases, a dummy for capital requirement,
and a dummy for sequence. The notations *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
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The results in Column C of Table 5
show that big banks offered higher deposit
rates than small banks. These results are
not entirely surprising, even after the de-
posit rates are adjusted, because big banks
acquired more substantial amounts of funds
from the deposit market. An average big
bank acquired 2,703 points from the de-
posit market, while an average small bank
acquired 1,961 points. Such behaviour can
be driven by the fact that big banks have a
larger amount of assets which can absorb
project losses. Moreover, big banks can
channel the acquired funds to assets with
fixed returns, and this also helps the banks
absorb projects’ losses. These features of
the big banks may eventually reduce the
probability of banks’ failure.
This study found no effect of increas-
ing the coverage limit on deposit rate of-
fers by the big and small banks. Big and
small banks did not become more aggres-
sive regarding offering deposit rates when
the coverage limit changes. However, there
is evidence that a higher coverage limit re-
duces the deposit rate offered by banks.
The estimated effect seems to be bigger
among big banks who are offering higher
adjusted deposit rates in the market. How-
ever, the effect of the 2,000 coverage limit
among all banks is only marginally signifi-
cant. These findings imply that banks,
whatever the coverage limit, competitively
acquire the available funds in the deposit
market, otherwise they cannot invest in the
credit market.
However, this study found that the
implementation of a differential premium
treatment significantly affects banks’
behaviours, particularly small banks. Spe-
cifically, small banks offered significantly
higher deposit rates in the differential pre-
mium treatment than in the fixed premium
treatment. The explanation is that the
implementation of a differential premium
treatment induces expectations among
small banks that they will pay a higher pre-
mium if their asset portfolio is risky. Thus,
a differential premium justified a bank seek-
ing riskier projects that accept higher in-
terest rates. This study did not see this
behaviour among the big banks because
they can channel the collected funds to risk-
free alternatives. On the other hand, small
banks must finance riskier projects to ob-
tain a profit margin because their costs of
funds are already higher.
The researchers have run similar re-
gressions to observe whether the coverage
limit and the differential premium treatment
affect banks’ compliance on offering de-
posit rate below or equal to the threshold
deposit rate. This study has presented the
results in Table A3 of the online appendix
and found consistent results with those
presented in Table 5. The big banks are
more likely to offer deposit rates above the
threshold rate, which can be explained by
the more substantial amounts of funds they
acquired from the market. The differential
premium treatment also significantly in-
duces small banks to offer deposit rate
above the threshold rate.
The researchers acknowledge that the
results in this study may seem
counterintuitive. An implementation of a
differential premium can induce banks to
reduce the risks of their asset portfolio. The
design can induce banks’ behaviours in this
experiment.The only cost associated with
a high-risk asset portfolio in this experi-
ment is a higher premium that banks can
pay in any case. In the real setting, the costs
associated with a high-risk asset portfolio
are more complicated than just a higher
premium. It could also be the case that the
Sahadewo et al.
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higher the premium a bank pays, the more
eager the bank is to engage in riskier deci-
sions. The bank is merely optimizing the
benefit of the deposit insurance.
Credit Market
In the credit market, banks channelled
the acquired funds from the deposit mar-
ket to finance firms’ projects. This study
first summarises the small and big banks’
choices. On average, the big banks chan-
nelled more funds to the credit market be-
cause the acquired more funds from the .
An average big bank channelled 3,312
points, while an average small bank chan-
nelled 2,540 points (difference -771, p-value
0.007).
The share of the small banks that
funded risky projects is also higher than the
share of big banks that funded risky
projects, although the difference is not sig-
nificant (0.039, p-value 0.136). Neverthe-
less, the fact that small banks are funding
risky projects is reflected in the credit rate.
Specifically, the average credit rate that
small banks offered to firms is about 3 per-
cent more than the average credit rate that
big banks offered (p-value 0.000). The main
explanation for this difference is that small
banks, by design, have higher costs of
funds.
This study now analyses the effects
of different deposit insurance schemes on
banks’ credit rate offers. Specifically, the
regressed credit rate offers on dummies for
the coverage limit treatments and a dummy
for the differential premium treatment was
rejected. The use of a Tobit regression
model, because the credit level is limited to
below 0 and above 25. With the included
data for the transaction phase to control
the phase and dummy effects that indicate
the type of bank. Using the same notation
as in the previous regression, the regression
model is:
Where premium is a dummy with a value
of 1 to show differential treatment, cover-
age is a vector of dummy for a coverage
limit, big is a dummy with a value of 1 to
indicate the big bank, X is a vector of dum-
mies for the transaction phases and a
dummy for sequence, a indicates partici-
pant-specific unobserved characteristics,
and  indicates idiosyncratic errors. The
regression results in Table 7.
Consistent with the summary statis-
tics, the average credit rate that big banks
accepted is lower than the average credit
rate that small banks accepted by about 3
percent. Again these findings imply that
small banks have to finance higher-risk
projects to obtain a margin from the high
costs of funds. This study found no impact
of the differential premium treatment on
credit rate offer, even among small banks
who were induced by the treatment to of-
fer higher adjusted deposit rate. The main
explanation for this finding is that small
banks are already taking high-risk projects
at high credit rate. Thus, the differential
premium treatment does not induce small
banks to offer higher credit rate.
Estimates from this study show that
a high coverage limit treatment has a sig-
nificant effect on credit rate offer. However,
the effect is limited among small banks but
not among big banks. On average, small
banks offered a higher credit rate by almost
2 percent when the coverage limit is 2,000.
The differences in the average credit rates
Creditrate
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Dependent Variable: 







    
    
1 if differential rate treatment -0.30 0.84 0.087 
 (0.79) (1.45) (0.80) 
    
2,000 coverage limits 1.81*** 1.05 1.43** 
 (0.62) (1.13) (0.63) 
    
500 coverage limits 0.29 0.67 0.27 
 (0.77) (0.78) (0.50) 
    
no coverage limit -0.093 0.42 -0.11 
 (0.73) (0.81) (0.54) 
    
1 if big bank   -2.95*** 
   (1.01) 
    
Observations 861 656 1517 
    
Pseudo R-sq 0.12 0.11 0.11 
 
Table 7. The Effects of Coverage Limit and Differential Rate Treatments on Credit
Rate Offer
Source: authors’ calculations from primary data
Note: estimated coefficients excluded from the table are dummies for transaction phases, a dummy for capital
requirement, and a dummy for sequence. The notations *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Figure 1. Average Credit Rate Across Coverage Limits
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across coverage limits are depicted in Fig-
ure 1, and it can be observed that the aver-
age credit rate when there is no deposit in-
surance or when the coverage limit was 500
or 1,000 does not differ significantly. In
these treatments, the average credit rate is
slightly below 13.8 percent, on the other
hand, the average credit rate when the cov-
erage limit was 2,000 is above 15.3 percent.
The main explanation for these find-
ings is the relative share of risky projects
regarding coverage limit treatment. In par-
ticular, the share of risky projects is higher
when the coverage limit is high. For ex-
ample, the share of risky projects among
small banks when the coverage limit is 2,000
points is 50.45 percent, while the share of
risky projects among them when the cov-
erage limit is 1,000 points is 45.98 percent.
Thus, the higher credit rate implies a higher-
risk asset portfolio.
To summarise, this study found that
big banks channelled more funds to the
credit market than small banks because
they obtain larger funds from the deposit
market. The big banks channelled their
funds to lower-risk projects, while the small
banks channelled their funds to higher-risk
projects. The differential premium treat-
ment, although it affects small banks’
behaviours in the deposit market, has no
significant effect on credit rate offer. This
study also found a significant effect of a
high coverage limit on credit rate
behaviours among small banks. Specifi-
cally, on average, small banks offered a
higher credit rate when the coverage limit
is 2,000. This behaviour is driven by the
fact that small banks have a higher share of
risky projects when the coverage limit is
2,000.
Conclusion
This study designed an experiment to
test the effects of a coverage limit and a
differential premium treatment on bankers’
behaviours in the deposit and credit mar-
ket. The results of the experiment show that
the coverage limit treatments do not have
any effect on banks’ deposit rate offers in
the deposit market. The researchers found
imply that banks compete to acquire funds
from the deposit market whatever the cov-
erage limit. However, the differential pre-
mium treatment increases the likelihood of
small banks to offer deposit rate above the
threshold rate. Consequently, the differen-
tial premium treatment induces small
banks to offer higher deposit rate.
In the credit market, small banks are
financing riskier projects that accept higher
interest rates. They do so because they have
a relatively higher cost of funds. This study
found that the high coverage limit induces
small banks to finance higher-risk projects
at higher credit rate. These findings indicate
that a higher coverage limit induces moral
hazard among small banks.
The researchers note several caveats
of these study that can be improved by
future studies. First, bankers face rational
depositors that only care about deposit
rates when choosing banks. In reality, de-
positors care not only about the deposit
rate but also services that a bank can offer.
Thus, negotiations in the deposit market
can be a more complex task.
Second, the depositors in the experi-
ments are played by computers. Thus,
bankers may not regret losing the deposi-
tors’ funds so much compared to when
bankers obtain the funds from real deposi-
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tors; and finally, the structure of the mar-
ket is limited to just three banks of two dif-
ferent sizes. In reality, the number of small
banks is considerably larger, and the com-
petition to acquire funds from the deposit
market and to channel the funds are more
intense. Despite this, the study’s design al-
ready captures the essential aspects of de-
cision making within the banking industry.
This study discussed policy implica-
tions for the deposit insurance regulations
in Indonesia and found no effect of the
coverage limit treatment on the deposit rate.
However, it is important for the Indone-
sian Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Indonesian Financial Supervisory Au-
thority to strengthen the market conduct
regulations. Some banks offer deposit rates
above the threshold rate set by the Indo-
nesian Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The results of the experiment also show
that a high coverage limit can induce moral
hazard among small banks. The policy im-
plication of this finding is that the Indone-
sian Deposit Insurance Corporation can
decrease the current coverage limit. Such
an action is feasible because depositors are
becoming more informed and more ratio-
nal in choosing banks. However, the de-
crease in the current coverage limit must
be accompanied by tighter supervision and
scrutiny of banks’ market conduct.
A lower coverage limit may not be
favorable for more than 1,600 rural banks
(bank perkreditan rakyat) in Indonesia. The
lower coverage limit may reduce deposi-
tors’ incentives to deposit their funds in
these banks, which manage riskier asset
portfolios than the conventional banks.
The governing and supervision bodies can
establish a roadmap that gives small or ru-
ral banks incentives to merge into bigger
banks. Size does matter in the banking in-
dustry, and merging of rural or small banks
into bigger banks increases economies of
scale and improves the efficiency of their
business. The governing and supervision
bodies can also incentivise bigger or con-
ventional banks to acquire small and rural
banks to obtain better economies of scale.
The system will consist of significantly less
small banks and significantly more bigger
and more efficient banks. That informed,
the roadmap must keep the number and
concentration of banks in balance to main-
tain the competitiveness and stability of the
banking system. All in all, this roadmap aims
to decrease the probability of a bank fail-
ure in the system. This would ultimately
decrease the probability of a systemic fail-
ure.
Lastly, this study discussed the re-
search implications for bank management.
The findings of the researchers suggest that
there is no significant effect of deposit in-
surance schemes on deposit rates. How-
ever, this study found that several banks
offer deposit rates higher than the thresh-
old rate, consistent with the empirical evi-
dence. Therefore, bank management must
strengthen their market conduct practices
in the deposit market to be in line with the
regulations. Bank management must also
strengthen its supervision on bankers’
choices of projects. The risk portfolio of
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